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Accident 2
Accident 2 was originally conceived so as to present the maximum possibility of bypassing the pH control system.
Accident 3
Subsequent to the evaluation of Accidents 1 and 2, Westinghouse personnel suggested that even greater bypass of the pH control system might OCCUT if IRWST drain down began before fission products were deposited. Hence, Accident 3 was conceived by judicious combination of Accidents 1 and 2. As in Accident 1, the fBsion product source &om the primary system is airborne, and assumed to deposit on wetted conltainment surfaces. As in Accident 2, drainage gutters route the fission products into the IRWST, rather than into the principal containment.
These accident sequences were formulated so as to bypass the pH control system in the AP-600 containment. Most iodine is eventually transported to the flooded containment, where trisodium phosphate raises the pH high enough to prevent volatilization. However, a substantial fraction (about 20% in Accident 2 and 29% in Accident 3) of the iodine remains in the IRWST, which never M y drains. This water does not access the trisodium phosphate, but instead is the repository for acids produced by radioIySis in containment. The continual lowering of pH in this volume does lead to some production of I,, which is vented to the containment airspace, and a small amount vented to the atmosphere.
It should be noted that no credit was taken for deposition processes, which may remove some of the gaseous 4. In the IRWST, and to a lesser extent in containment, the condensation of water on walls would both impede permanent deposition and return I, to the IRWST pool. Here, it would be revo1atilize:d and returned to the containment atmosphere, although the time lag, would tend to lower the overall environmental source.
It should also be noted that the temperatures asmned for this sequence (1 1 1-1 20 "C) are beyond the range for which some of the models have been validated. The hydrolysis rr:actions have been measured at 25, 50, and 9O"C, and extrapolation to slightly higher temperatures is not unreasonable. Data for the radiolysis reactions are sparse at temperatures above 25 "C, and indicate that the model slightly overpredicts convwsion to I, (this is conservative). The chemical equilibrium model is reliable at least to lOO"C, and slight extrapolation should be acceptable. The production of HC1 is more pronounced at higher temperatures, although this effect is not significant below 150°C. Thus, uncertainties due to temperature extrapolation are not large, and are probably not nearly as great as uncertainties due to sequence formulation.
Introduction
This study is a companion to an earlier one,' both of which are intended to evaluate pH control and iodine volatilization in the AP-600 reactor under design-basis accident conditions. The previous study considered a variation of the 3BE (small-break LOCA) sequence (hereafter described as "Acciclent 1") and was designed to present a maximum challenge to the capabilities of the containment pH control system. Two additional accident sequences are described in the present study.
Accident 2
This accident was originally conceived so as to present the maximum possibility of bypassing the pH control system.
Containment flooding leaves a residual amount (about 20%) of water in the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST), where it is not accessible to pH control chemicals. Typically, under nonnal operation, containment drainage gutters are set to route all wall condensation (including radiolytically produced acids) into the IRWST, further lowering the pH. Iodine in this water would be subject to volatilization and would be unaffected by the containment pH control system. The actual accident sequence, designated "Spurious ADS," involves the following features:
(1) Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Stages 1,2, and 3 work as intended, but Stage 4 fails.
(2) Injection works for two Core Make-up T + s (CMT), two accumulators, the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVS), and the Boric Acid Tank (BAT).
(3) IRWST injection to core fails, but drainage to containment works fully.
(4) IRWST gutter works.
Under this sequence, fission products are deposited directly into the IRWST, where no pH control occurs. For simplicity, this s o u~c e is assumed to be instantaneous, composed of the gap releases and in-vessel releases specifled in NUREG-1465: These amounts, which are identical to those used in the earlier study,' are shown in Table 1 .1. The sequence begins at this point for purposes of pH and iodine evaluation. Also at initial time, IRWST drainage to the containment begins and subsequently moves most of the iodine (and other fission products) to the containment. Mixing of the water with trisodium phosphate (TSP) raises the pH well above 9, virtually eliminating iodine volatilization. However, the residual water in the IRWST contains about 20% of the iodine released fiom the primary system; and since no pH control exists, the potential for iodine volatilization ishigh.
Accident 3
Subsequent to the evaluation of Accidents 1 and 2, Westinghouse personnel suggested that even greater bypass of the pH control system might occur if IRWST drain-down began before fission products had been deposited. Hence, Accident 3 was conceived by the judicious combination of Accidents 1 and 2. As in Accident 1, the fission product source from the prknary system is airborne and is assumed to deposit on wetted containment surfaces. As in Accident 2, drainage gutters route the fission products into the IRWST, rather than into the principal containment.
In practice, this sequence is modeled similar to '4ccident 2, except for a source term that is time dependent rather than instantaneouS. The timing of fission product rellwe from the primary system is exactly that of Accident 1, consisting of gap and in-vessel releases from Reference 2. These are deposited directly into the IRWST, simulating the processes of surface deposition and drainage in condensate. While detailed modeling of the actual processes would involve some lag time, it is expected to be short compared with the accident duration. All other thermal hydraulic conditions in Accident 3 are assumed to be identical to those of Accident 2 and are described in the following section. In addition, all additives and chemicals that would affect pH are also assumed to be identical to those in Accident 2.
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Thermal Hydraulic Conditions 
Thermal Hydraulic Conditions
In the early stages, venting of the primary system to the IRWST would raise its level to a maximum and its temperature to saturation. Continued steaming eventually creates a small, but signrficant, flow from the IRWST gas space to the main containment However, this gas flow does not actually begin until the water drainage to main containment is complete (since water drainage itself produces a much larger gas inflow). Containment leakage to the environment represents an additional gas flow.
Pressure and Temperature
According to Westinghouse estimates, the containment pressure will increase to 29 psia within 2 h of ADS operation (Stages 1, 2, and 3) and will decrease to 22 psia after 30 days. Thus, we assume 29 psia for the first 24 h of the sequence, followed by a linear decrease to 22 psia over the remaining 29 days. Assuming the presence of saturation conditions implies temperatures in all gas and water phases of 120°C at the start, decreasing to 11 1 "C after 30 days.
IRWST Drain
The flow rate of water h m the IRWST to the containment was taken from plots of such flow in the AP-600 design d~cument.~ The drain flow, as illustrated in Figure 2 .1, takes about 5 h to complete. 
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IRWST Venting
As stated in Section 2, steaming of the IRWST produces a small gas flow to containment after the water drain is complete.
The steaming is caused by continued heat generation due to decay heat of the fission products, coupled with condensation of steam on the containment shell. Westinghouse provided estimate2 of 250 cfm at 2 h, 100 cfm at 24 h, and 40 cfin at 6 days.
These three values were fit to the empirical form
resulting in values of A = 8.54 x
The constant 4 = 1 m3/s allows for changing to other units. The flow h Equation (1) was applied after 5 h and lasted throughout the entire 30 days, although it became negligibly small by the end of the accident period.
(s-l), B = 2.53 x
Containment Leakage
Westinghouse provided an estimate' that the conttinment leakage to the atmosphere was 0.12% per day. Use of this estimate resulted in flow rate of 6.62 x lo-' m3/s throughout each accident sequence.
Containment Chemistry
Most iodine enters Containment as CsI aerosol," which is readily dissolved in sumps or surface condensate. Even if released intothecontainm ent atmosphere, most iodine will quickly settle onto wetted surfaces and will be washed into sumps or pooh. In accident sequences 2 and 3, CsI is released dir~xdy into IRWST water. It has been well established6-*that the volatility of iodine is closely related to the pH of water pools in various containment volumes.
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Containment Chemistry
Even highly soluble iodide (I-) can be converted to other forms (e.g., I2 and organic iodides) that more easily evaporate fiom water and could be subsequently vented to the environment. At 25 "C, this conversion is negligible for pH levels greater than 7, but dominant for pH levels less than 3. Thus, the presence of various chemicals that affect water pH is quite important in detennjning the extent of iodine volatility. In each accident sequence, we consider three such chemicals present in the AP-600 @.e., borates, phosphates, and hydrochloric acid) that are expected to dominate the calculation of pH in various locations.
Borates
Most water in these sequences originally contains various forms of borates, which, regardless of initial form, hydrolyzes to form boric acid and various polyborate species? The concentration in the IRWST is 2700 ppm (0.25 morn) as boron. The concentration in the reactor primary system varies, depending on additions from various tanks and accumulators; however, the average is not significantly different from that of the IRWST. While the processes of steaming and condensation produce surfaces wetted with nonborated water, the latter is expected to quickly drain into pools. Thus, all water is assumed to have a boron concentration of 2700 ppm (0.25 mom).
Phosphates
The AP-600 design includes the placement of baskets of trisodium phosphate (TSP) in the lower containment, which will dissolve and increase the pH in the flooded containment. The design specification is for a minimum of 7830 Ib of TSP (43% as anhydrous salt, corresponding to the dodecahydrate NqPO,*12&0), which translates to 9309 mol. Invariably, TSP contains small amounts of NaOH (true even of reagent-grade TSP); however, this excess caustic was not considered. (It is conservative to neglect the excess NaOH.) In these accident sequences, the TSP begins dissolving when the water level in containment reaches the floor of the steam generator rooms ( 8 3 4 elevation) and is completely dissolved after rising 3 m (9.8 fi) above the floor. It is assumed to be distributed uniformly and instantly throughout all water in the flooded containment (i.e., a well-mixed volume is assumed).
Acids
Irradiation tends to produce various acids that would decrease pH, therefore, their effects must be considered in assessing overall iodine volatility. Small amounts of nitric acid are produced from the irradiation of air-water mixtures; however, this effect is assumed to be negligible and, therefore, was not included in the present analysis. The irradiation and heating of electrical cable insulation have been shown to produce sigruficant quantities of hydrochloric and sulfuric acids," which are subsequently dissolved in condensate and collected in sumps. In the present sequences, the calculation follows the procedure outlined in Appendix B of Reference 10. Since containment drainage gutters are set to route wall condensation to the IRWST, all acids are deposited there as well.
Fission Product Sources
In Accident 2, all fission products are assumed to be released through spargers into the IRWST at the start of the accident sequence. Because there is very little gas space in the IRWST at this time, noble gases are assumed to vent instantly into the containment atmosphere. All iodine is assumed to be initially CsI and to be immediately dissolved in IRWST water. In reality, a small quantity of volatile iodine might be present in the source fiom the primary system; however, our goal is to predict volatilization of that iodine which was initially nonvolatile. The assumption that all iodine occurs initially as iodide allows a clearer assessment of this process. Finally, all other fission products are assumed to be nonvolatile for the entire accident. They are released into water and travel with it either in solution or in suspension. The primary reason for considering noble gases and nonvolatile fission products is to allow calculation of the radiation doses to water pools and gas spaces.
For Accident 3, the release is hitially into containment airspace, but all fission products except noble gases become quickly entrained in condensate and deposited in the IRWST. This is true of both CsI and less volatile fission products. Noble gases,
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Containment Chemistry however, are assumed to be instantly released into the containment, as in Accident 2. However, in Accident 3, the releases are timed (see Reference 2), rather than instantaneow;.
Iodine Chemistry
Hydrolysis
In aqueous solution, iodine can undergo hydrolysis, which is described well by the following reaction set:"" Iz+40 * I-+HOI+H+, The end-point oxidation states that I-and IO; (or HIO,) are both extremely soluble and, therefore, highly desirable. The HOI and HIO, species are reaction intermediates, which may be volatile but are regarded as having short lietimes. However, molecular iodine, Iz, is stable and sparingly soluble. It can be seen in the above reactions that low pH levels (Le., a large H+ concentration) will result in more I, and less I ' and IO,-. Each forward and reverse reaction gives rise to a single rate equation, as described in Reference 1 1.
Radiolysis
In a radioactive environment., the presence of free radicals induces additional aqueous reactions. The overall result can be described empirically by the equilibrium" where a and b are known coefficients depending cdy on temperature. The actual rate equations used in this study are based on the catalytic decomposition of hydrogen peroxide, one of the stable by-products of irradiating water. The peroxide inventoiy is estimated empirically, based on cumulative dose, pH, dissolved oxygen content, and temperature. The forward rate coefficients are then based on the data of Liebhafsky,'? and the: reverse coefficients are chosen to move steadily toward equilibrium (3).
Gashiquid Partitioning
The same equation is used to describe the evaporrition of volatile iodine species from water (4 or CHJ) and their dissolution b m gas back to the water. The model is based on the equilibrium partition coefficients (inverse of Henry's Law constant) fir each species and rate equations obtained fkom natural convection correlations."
Organic Iodides
Organic iodides are described empirically by the fbrmation of CH,I from I, in the gas phase. The model used is described l l l y in Reference 1 1. Analogous to-4, CH,I is sparingly soluble in water -an effect which is negligible in the accident sequences considered here.
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Computation I
Radiation Doses
Several of the models depend on the prediction of decay energy in air or water. Energy outputs for beta and gamma radiation are given in Table 3 .1 for each fission product group at various times. These were calculated by using ORIGEN" results for fission product inventories, together with ICRP datal4 for nuclide decay energies.
The doses to water assume that all energy from beta and gamma decay is absorbed in water. They are calculated by combining information from Table 3 .1 (interpolated to the correct time) with the water inventories of each fission product group at each time step, as obtained from MAAP reactor analysis code output.
The rate of HC1 formation in cable sheathing is based on the energy production rates (both beta and gamma) due to fission products that are airborne or deposited on surfaces. The latter rates are calculated using the procedure described in Reference 10. 
Computation
The geometry for the sequences in Accidents 2 and 3 involves only the three control volumes listed in Table 4 .1. A computational model was constructed to describe each relevant physical and chemical process in the entire system. Rate equations were developed for each process and solved together to give a transient description of convective transport and chemical interactions for the duration of the accident. The sequences are divided into discrete time steps, and at each step the following actions are taken (in the order indicated): (1) sources of fission products or pH-influencing chemicals are introduced; (2) convective flow transfers between different control volumes are computed; (3) the pH within each control volume is 
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Sources
In addition to fission products, there are sources of pH-influencing chemicals. Borate is present in all water, as mentioned in Section 3.1. TSP is dissolved during the iirst few hours, consistent with the water level increase in containment (see (The production of HC1 is due almost entirely to radiation from noble gases, which is the same in each of the sequences considered here.)
Convective Flow
Transfers of gas or liquid inventories between control volumes are based on the flows discussed in Section 2. The volume fraction of fluid that leaves the control volume dilring a time step is assumed to cany that same fraction of components. Thus, for a 1-h time step, containment venting to the almosphere moves .12/24, or .005%, of the containment gas volume (see Section 2.4). Then, in the same time step, .0050/6 of current gaseous iodine and noble gas inventories would also be transferred to the environment.
Determination of pH
Inventories of all aqueous constituents are updated in the source and flow steps above. The calculation of pH assvmes that equilibrium is reached rapidly. The equilibrium calculation model uses the principal subroutine "GASOL" of the code SOLGASMIX." The calculation uses an extended Debye-Hockel form for activity coefficients and includes multiple phosphate and borate species. The model itself and its validation with actual data are described in Reference 1 1.
Control Volume Chemistqf
The most complicated part of the calculation is The simultaneous solution of all rate equations arising in Section 3.5 relative to iodine hydrolysis, radiolysis, gadliquid partitioning, and methyl iodlde formation. This set of ordinary differential equations is solved by using the routine LSODE and related routines. 
]Results and Discussion
The model described in Section 4 was run for a 30-day transient in the case of both Accidents 2 and 3. The pH levels in the IRWST and containment water were virtually identical in each sequence (see Figure 5 .1). The pH of borated water, which is somewhat below 6, is changed considerably by sclurces of other chemicals (water is above 100°C). Due to the HC1 SoUTce, the pH of the IRWST water declined steadily for the first 8 h and, &r 30 days, had decreased to almost 3.0. While the pH of the containment water declined briefly, it rose abruptly when phosphate dissolution began and stayed above 9.5 for the remainder of the 30-day transient.
For Accident 2, iodine speciation in the two water pools is depicted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 , which show that a gradual oxidation of I-to IO; began quickly in each case. Note thtit the plotted quantity "fraction of containment total" includes all iodine released fiom the reactor coolant system, which is 40% of the total core inventory. In the IRWST water, the process continued throughout the 30-day accident transient, eventually yielding almost complete conversion to IO; . This is consistent with experimental results at 25°C and is caused by the tandem processes of radiolysis and hydrolysis. In the former, I-is converted to I,; in the latter, I, is converted-primarily to I-, but also some fiaction to IO3-. Over time, accumulation of IO3-is the inevitable result for moderate pH values. Howevcer, in the containment sump, the process was abruptly terminated once the water level rose sufficiently to dissolve TSP (at about 30 min). At this point, the inventories of 4 and HOI decreased drastically, and the destruction of I-was effectively ended. In Figure 5 .2, inventories of all species increased due to additions Erom IRWST drainage, however, they stabilized sit about 5 h and changed very little after that point. The intermediates HOI and HIO, continued to oxidize slowly, and the inventory of IO; eventually exceeded that of HIO, (at about 17 days). Note also that the I, concentration was much higher in the IRW!ST water (where the pH was low). While complete oxidation to IO,-would occur in a closed volume, the presence of a significant aqueous I, inventory in a vented control volume would allow evaporation and escape of gaseous I, . This effect can be seen in Figure 5 .4, where I, has evaporated from the IRWST water into the IRWST airspace and is subsequently vented into the containment airspace. From there, some I, is redissolved in the containment water (see Section 3.5.3), while a small amount is actually released to the environment.
The cumulative environmental releases at various times are shown in 
The speciation of volatile gaseous iodine, as shown in Figure 5 .5, confirms that I, is the dominant form, as expected.
oI A 6 .
The iodine inventories for Accident 3 (see Figures 5.6-5.9) are very similar to the analogous results for Accident 2. Since almost 50% more iodine ends up in the IRWST 'water, greater volatilization would be expected. This is borne out in Table 5 .1, where roughly 50% more iodine is released to the environment at times exceeding 24 h. Two design-basis accidents for the AP-600 reactor are formulated and evaluated, in which significant bypass of the principal pH control system occurs. Some iodine released from the reactor primary system is retained in the Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) water, never entering the containment, where trisodium phosphate produces a high PH. Some of this iodine is volatilized and is transported into the reactor containment airspace. In the worst case, a small fraction is released to the environment at designbasis leak rate, yielding a total cumulative iodine release at 30 days of 0.0352 mol (0.023% of core iodine inventory) due to the iodine volatilization bypassing the pH control system. No fission product removal in the containment atmosphere (i.e., natural deposition sprays) is considered. 
